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ABSTRACT
The concept of sovereignty of states is a rather complex one to address but
indeed one of central importance for any discussion pertaining to International Law.
This derives from the fact that only sovereign states are “recognized” subjects
and makers of Public International Law1 (PIL).
One aspect seems to be widely accepted: just as the birth of a human being
marks the beginning of his or her legal personality2, a state’s recognition as
sovereign will likewise acknowledge its capacity to be subject of international law
normative framework. For that reason, the establishment of a State as sovereign has
been the cause for countless conflicts - armed or

diplomatic - and for extensive

debate among scholars and practitioners of International Law.
International law regards sovereignty an independent personality. States are the
paradigmatic image of this. Modern international law developed primarily by viewing
states as individuals, and elaborating the natural law which ought to apply between
them.
The first goal of this paper will then be the discussion of the definition of
what Sovereignty is. Secondly, and perhaps even more challenging, we have to
consider what sovereignty entails.
The concept closely links with that of territoriality, but it is not to be confused
with the

latter, which represents the boundaries3 and limits of the state’s existence as

such. However, the purpose of the following thesis is not to address the
philosophic conception of sovereignty, but rather to address the visible aspects of its
manifestations of the interactions that might rise between sovereign states.

1

We could add that even in regards to a state’s Domestic Law, sovereignty is fundamental

Characteristics and qualities (such as age and domicile) from which human beings derive their legal capacity
and status, within their society's legal order. It is the sum total of an individual's legal advantages and
disadvantages. In, http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/legal-personality.html
3 Including not only the land but also aerial space and, where applicable, the seas
2
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Acronyms and Abbreviations
CoI

Commission of Inquiry

HR

Human Rights

ICC

International Criminal Court

ICISS

International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty

ICJ

International Court of Justice

LoN

League of Nations

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

PIL

Public International Law

R2P

Responsibility to Protect

UN

United Nations

UNC

United Nations Charter

UNEF

United Nations Emergency Force

UNMOGIP

United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan

UNSC

United Nations Security Council

UNSG

United Nations Secretary General

UNTSO

United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine

UNGA

United Nations General Assembly

PM

Permanent Members
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When the sovereignty of states must be questioned
In line with the philosophy of law, Sovereignty refers to the right of
exercising the functions of State in a specific territory as well as to develop the
capacities of the State in economic, political and social aspects. In order to be able to
participate in international affairs, a state must be recognized4 sovereignty by the
other States or at least by a vast majority. Only after this recognition a state is
considered to exist as subject of PIL and from there onwards acquires the capacity of
enjoying fully its “rights and duties” under PIL.

4

It cannot be a unilateral act.
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The collision of responsibility to protect (R2P) and the sovereignty of
states
More than 60 years after the founding of the UN, peacekeeping operations have
become the most visible and important activity of the Organization.
But such operations were not anticipated by the founders of the United Nations
and are not mentioned at in the UNC - hence the nickname of “Chapter VI ½ measures”
as they somehow fit between measures under Chapter VI and VII of the UNC.
Peacekeeping was developed as a series of ad hoc practical mechanism used by
the United Nations to help contain armed conflicts and settle them by peaceful means.
They were devised by the Organization at the start of the Cold War because its
original collective security system became ineffectual as a result of the increasing
disagreement between the two superpowers.
The original system devised by the United Nations to ensure international peace
and security is outlined in Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the Charter.
When a dispute arises between two States, the parties concerned are obliged,
under Chapter VI, to seek a solution by peaceful means, mainly by negotiation,
conciliation, mediation, and arbitration. If the peaceful means prove insufficient and the
dispute escalates into armed conflict, then Chapter VII comes into play.
This Chapter, which constitutes the core of the United Nations collective
security system, stipulates that in the case of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace,
or act of aggression, the Security Council (SC) may take enforcement measures to
restore peace. First, there should be an attempt at non-military measures such as arms
embargoes and economic sanctions and, when these approaches are exhausted, the use
of force5.
Lastly, Chapter VIII states that the SC should encourage the peaceful
settlements of local disputes through regional agencies and also should, when
appropriate, utilize such agencies for enforcement action under its authority.
In theory, the key provisions of the United Nations collective security
However, the UNC does not prohibit the SC from imposing directly measures under Chapter VII. In
accordance with article 42: “Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 [not
involving the use of force} would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate”.
5
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system concern the use of force under Chapter VII. Plans for such use of force must be
made by the Security Council itself, with the assistance of the United Nations Military
Staff Committee. Since the five major powers that played a key role in the
creation of the United Nations are permanent members of the Security Council,
endowed with the right of veto, and since they also make up the Military Staff
Committee, the Charter provisions on the use of force can be applied effectively
only with their consent and continued co-operation.
This co-operation was impossible during the Cold War, when the relations
among the major powers, and especially between the two superpowers, became marred
by mistrust and disagreement. The inapplicability of the Charter provisions on the
collective use of force created a vacuum that had to be filled somehow. Obviously, not
all international disputes could be settled by peaceful means. Some were needed to stop
or contain disputes that escalated into armed conflict and endangered international
peace and security. Hence, traditional peacekeeping operations developed progressively
and pragmatically.
The first peacekeeping operation was deployed in 1948: a military observer
mission to Palestine called the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in
Palestine (UNTSO). In 1949, a similar military observer mission, The United
Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) was deployed,
and which continues to render valuable services today. In 1956 the first peacekeeping
force, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was deployed in response to
the Suez crisis. Since that time, the number of peacekeeping operations has steadily
grown.
The implementation of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter has been
much less effective. In fact, although the SC can theoretically “make war to end war,”
in practice it rarely does so. When guns must be used to restore peace, the SC must
delegate the task to others because it lacks its own army 6— usually coalitions as in
Korea in 1950 or in the Persian Gulf in 1990-1991.
The 1992 publication of UN Secretary-General’s “Agenda for Peace” and its
Supplement in January 1995 were especially influential in this development. According
to these two important texts, peace operations can be defined as follows:
6

Article 45 of the UNC could never really be implemented because such armed forces were not made available.
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“A comprehensive term encompassing military support to diplomacy, observers
and monitors, traditional peacekeeping, preventive deployment, security assistance to a
civil authority, protection and delivery of humanitarian relief, imposing sanctions, and
peace enforcement”
Peacekeeping involves non-combat military operations (in which arms are
only used in self-defensive) that are undertaken by external forces with the consent
of all major conflicting parties. It is designed to monitor and facilitate implementation
of an existing truce agreement in support of diplomatic efforts to reach a political
settlement to the dispute.
Traditional peacekeeping operations were originally thought to be temporary
military interventions, intended to support cease-fire agreements while diplomats could
seek to address what were fundamentally political issues, not military issues.
In recent practice, the distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement
operations has become unclear. The complexity of the conflicts in which the United
Nations has become involved as a peace-keeper under Chapter VI has sometimes shifted
or escalated the operation into peace enforcement under Chapter VII. A prime example
is the operation in Somalia, in which the United Nations' initial involvement was for
humanitarian relief under a Security Council resolution adopted under Chapter VI of the
Charter. The United Nations’ involvement was then called up to enforcement mode
under Chapter VII, authorized by the Security Council, to use “all means necessary” to
establish a secure environment for the humanitarian operations in Somalia. In some
circumstances, peacekeeping operations have been expanded to include peace
enforcement operations.
After this brief overview of the “Peacekeeping” concept, let us concentrate in the
notion of the “responsibility to protect” (R2P) and the controversy surrounding it.
Human Rights (HR) baseline has been provided by the United Nations Charter
(UNC). It addresses the issue directly and employs the terminology of HR for the first
time.
In UNC’s preamble the State members “reaffirm faith in fundamental human
rights, in the equal rights of men and women” and, on article 1 (3), the purpose of the
United Nations (UN) includes “promoting and encouraging respect for human rights
and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or
9

religion”.
Article 55 (c) is even more daring and imposes that the UN shall promote
“universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms

for

all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion”.
When it comes to enforcement mechanisms however, the UNC lacks clear
legal instruments to trigger enforcement against state members’ violating HR.
The fundamental reason for this is the fact that Human Rights do greatly
challenge “the

rights” of States. As quick examples we can point out that HR

investigations defy the inviolability of states sovereignty; the fight against terrorism (a
right and duty of any State) is limited by the prohibition of the use of torture.
External military intervention for human rights protection purposes has been
controversial both when it has happened – as in Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo – and
when it has failed to happen, as in Rwanda.
For some, the new activism has been a long overdue internationalization of the
human conscience in an obvious defence of the “responsibility to protect” (R2P)
approach;
For others it has been an alarming breach of an international state order, dependent
on sacrosanct sovereignty7 of states and the inviolability of their territory8.
For some, again, the only real issue is how to go about in ensuring that coercive
interventions are timely and effective;
For others, questions about legality, process and the possible misuse or
establishment of precedents must be the sacred concern.
NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999 brought the controversy to its most
intense stage. Security Council members were divided; the legal justification for
military action without new Security Council authority was asserted but largely
unchallenged; the moral or humanitarian justification for the action, which on the
face of it was much stronger, was clouded by allegations that the intervention generated
more bloodshed than it prevented; and there were many criticisms of the way in which

“The Court should now mention the principle of respect for State sovereignty, which in International Law is of
course linked with the principles of the prohibition of use of force and non-intervention” (ICJ, Nicaragua 1986,
para. 212, p.111).
8 “(…) between independent states, respect for territorial sovereignty is an essential foundation of international
relations (…) the action of the British Navy constituted a violation of Albanian sovereignty”. ICJ, Corfu Channel
case (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Albania), 9April 1949, page 35.
7
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the NATO allies conducted the operation.
More recently, the developments witnessed in North African and Middle Eastern
countries, have again brought actuality and relevance to these discussions.
Syria is certainly the most worrying and most actual case. Every day the News
passes on reports of gross violations of human rights being committed. Not anymore
only by the Syrian government forces but also by the opponents to Assad’s rule.
The death toll increases by the day under elaborated, not to say hypocrite,
arguments. One side saying they are only saving their esteemed citizens from
“terrorists” and the other considering themselves “freedom fighters”.
And while all this is on-going, what is the international community doing in
regards to Human Rights (HR) violations?
Little more than more or less elaborated oratory and inflamed speeches. Strong
statements of condemn have been made, appeals to compliance with Human Rights and
Humanitarian law have been done, warnings and promises of future prosecution or other
forms of accountability enforcement have been directed against the most responsible.
What about the side of active and tangible measures undertaken or implemented
aiming at restore peace and stop the gross HR violations?
A “Commission of Inquiry on Syria” (CoI) was appointed by the Human
Rights Council9. This CoI has endeavoured to collect evidence, namely statements from
alleged victims of human rights violations perpetrated by government agents, in order to
insure the respect to the required standards of proof, regarding the allegations of Human
Rights (HR) abuses against the Syrian government.
However, Syria has never allowed the CoI investigators performing those “factfinding” missions inside Syrian territory. The collection of evidence was thus limited to
interviews with refugee around the neighbouring countries (Turkey, Lebanon, Iraq and
Jordan). Access has been therefore a major liability the CoI’s has been faced with.
The United Nations10 and the League of Arab States, in a joint effort to help
explore a

peaceful political solution to the conflict in Syria have appointed, on 23

February 2012, ex-UN

9

Secretary General (UNSG) Kofi Annan as “Joint Special

Created by the United Nations General Assembly on 15 March 2006 by resolution 60/251

10

Department of Political Affaires (DPA).
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Representative for Syria”. By the

16th of March, Kofi Annan had drafted a plan11

aiming to negotiate a truce that could stop the violence and the killings and open ways
for the reconciliation and peaceful transition. To present, the implementation of that
plan has not been accomplished with both sides to the conflict consistent and
continuously violating it.
Kofi Annan resigned on the 2nd of August 2012, citing the intransigence of the
Assad government and the rebels, as well as the impasse on the Security Council as
preventing any peaceful resolution of the situation12.
The European Union has also established a series of economic and political
sanctions and an arms embargo against Syrian interests. However, their real impact in
solving the humanitarian crisis has been too little.
In any case, regarding measures such as economic sanctions we need to be
mindful of former UNSG Kofi Annan informed opinion:
“When robust and comprehensive economic sanctions are directed against
authoritarian regimes, a different problem is encountered. Then it is usually the people
who suffer, not the political elites whose behavior triggered the sanctions in the
first place. Indeed, those in power, perversely, often benefit from such sanctions by
their ability to control and profit from black market activity, and by exploiting them
as a pretext for eliminating domestic sources of political opposition.”13
The UN, particularly the Security Council (SC) – UN’s only organ able of
impose enforcement measures - has been unable to take hardly any substantive action14.
Russia and China have been insistently exercising their veto invoking the above
mentioned arguments of the inviolability of Syria’s sovereignty who is dealing with its
domestic problems, and the lack of legal support within the scope of the UN Charter to
11

Known as the “six-point peace plan”. Interestingly the middle point aimed at: “(3) ensure timely provision of
humanitarian assistance to all areas affected by the fighting (…)”.

12UNSG

Ban Ki-moon just announced, on the 17 of August 2012, the appointment of Lakhdar Brahimi as the
new “Joint Special Representative for Syria”.
13 Report of United Nations Secretary General “We the peoples: the role of the United Nations in the 21 st
Century”, A/54/2000, 27 March 2000. Para. 219. Para. 231.
Security Council Resolution 2043, of 21 April 2012, established a United Nations Supervision Mission in
Syria (UNSMIS), for an initial period of 90 days – later renewed for another 30 days , by Resolution 2059 under the command of a Chief Military Observer, comprising an initial deployment of up to 300 unarmed
military observers as well as an appropriate civilian component to fulfill the following mandate: To monitor a
cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties and to monitor and support the full implementation of
the Envoy’s six-point plan. The General Assembly has also passed Resolutions recommending the end of
hostilities and a peaceful the transition of power. These however have no binding effect.
14

12

interfere without Syria’s consent.
The inconformity from the nations15 who abstain to vote or vote contrary to a
possible resolution by the Security Council for collective actions in Syria, are based
under Article 2(7) of the first chapter of the UN Charter:
“Nothing shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to
submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle

shall

not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII”
Russia has been particularly representative of this view. However accurate this
position in defence of Legality might be, the legitimacy of such position and the real
reasons for those position can surely be questioned.
If we go back and see through the UNSC’s actions in the case of Libya, a very
similar and recent crisis, we conclude that Security Council did act. The differences
between both crises, from a humanitarian point of view, are not really substantial but the
UNSC has acted quite differently.
First through Resolution 1970 (2011), of the 26 February 2011, under article 4116
of the UN Charter (UNC), the Security Council:
“Urges the Libyan authorities to: (a) Act with the utmost restraint, respect
human rights and international humanitarian law, and allow immediate access for
international human rights monitors (…)”
And soon after, on the 17th of March 2011, once confronted with Libya’s
noncompliance with Resolution 1970 and in face of a continuously deteriorating
situation, the Security Council again decides to act. This time it hardens its position onto
measures authorizing the use of force (under article 42 of the UNC):
(…) 3.Demands that the Libyan authorities comply with their obligations under
international law, including international humanitarian law, human rights and
refugee law and take all measures to protect civilians and meet their basic needs, and to
ensure the rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian assistance 4. Authorizes
Member States that have notified the Secretary-General, acting nationally or through
regional organizations or arrangements, and acting in cooperation with the
China and Russia believe in the principles of sovereign equality and non-interference; Iran said that it
violated the Charter principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of States etc.
16 Chapter VII - “Measures not involving the use of armed force”,
15
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Secretary-General, to take all necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of
resolution 1970 (2011), to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under
threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a
foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory (…)17
If the legal instruments to act are not missing why then, is the SC now being
blocked and thus prevented from taking a similar active role?
Some argue that in Libya things went too far in what international intervention is
concerned and that it is therefore necessary to avoid establishing a precedent grounded
on that intervention.
We can indeed question if the intervention in Libya was well coordinated and did
strictly abide by the principles of necessity and proportionality. We can also perhaps
accuse the SC’s resolutions of having been too vague, a carte blanche that allowed for
vast interpretation.
But does it really explain why the SC is now failing to agree on measures to stop
the humanitarian crisis and thus blocked from taking any really effective action? I am
afraid not.
It is rather the complex network of lobby’s and domestic interests 18 together with
the fear of disrupting the fragile coexisting Middle Eastern states what is really at stake.
Obviously, on the “underground” stage or non-official arenas things are quite
different. The “game” there is about finding ways to capitalize on the state of things.
States care about the satisfaction of their own private economic and political agendas
and look the other way in regards to the humanitarian disaster happening there.
At the United Nations General Assembly in 1999, and again in 2000, SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan made compelling pleas to the international community to try to
find, once and for all, a new consensus on how to approach these issues, to “forge
unity” around the basic questions of principle and process involved. He posed the
central question frankly and directly:
(…) if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on
sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and
systematic violations of human rights that affect every precept of our common
Points 3 and 4 of UN Security Council resolution 1973.
Russia has a long standing military and strategic relationship with Syria and President Assad. China has in
Syria an important commercial partner, particularly in terms of armament.
17
18
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humanity?”
And he pointed out the possible way forward:
“To strengthen protection, we must reassert the centrality of international
humanitarian and human rights law. We must strive to end the culture of impunity which is why the creation of the International Criminal Court is so important.
We must also devise new strategies to meet changing needs.”19
In response to this challenge, the Government of Canada, together with a group
of major foundations, announced at the General Assembly in September 2000, the
establishment of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
(ICISS).
The Commission was asked to deal with the whole range of questions – legal,
moral, operational and political – linked to this debate, to consult with the widest
possible range of opinion around the world, and to bring back a report that
would help the Secretary-General and everyone else find some new common ground.
On that report the ICISS recommended:
(…)” to the General Assembly: That the General Assembly adopt a draft
declaratory resolution embodying the basic principles of the responsibility to protect,
and containing four basic elements: an affirmation of the idea of sovereignty as
responsibility; an assertion of the threefold responsibility of the international
community of states – to prevent, to react and to rebuild – when faced with human
protection claims in states that are either unable or unwilling to discharge their
responsibility to protect; a definition of the threshold (large scale loss of life or
ethnic cleansing, actual or apprehended) which human protection claims must meet if
they are to justify military intervention; and an articulation of the precautionary
principles (right intention, last resort, proportional means and reasonable prospects)
that must be observed when military force is used for human protection purposes.
(…) to the Security Council: (1) That the members of the Security Council should
consider and seek to reach agreement on a set of guidelines, embracing the “Principles
for Military Intervention” summarized in the Synopsis, to govern their responses to
claims for military intervention for human protection purposes. (2) That the Permanent
Five members of the Security Council should consider and seek to reach agreement not
Report of United Nations Secretary General “We the peoples: the role of the United Nations in the 21 st
Century”, A/54/2000, 27 March 2000. Para. 211
19
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to apply their veto power, in matters where their vital state interests are not involved, to
obstruct the passage of resolutions authorizing military intervention for human
protection purposes for which there is otherwise majority support.
(…) to the Secretary-General: That the Secretary-General give consideration, and
consult as appropriate with the President of the Security Council and the President of
the General Assembly, as to how the substance and action recommendations of this
report can best be advanced in those two bodies, and by his own further action.(…)20
Other legal and policy texts, as well as scholar’s statements have important
references to the R2P concept21, however the reluctance of states is still largely
unbeaten. States fear opening a “Pandora box” by admitting to the R2P.
The R2P does have the potential to allow States’ abuse, namely by invoking it
with strategic interests rather than humanitarian concern.
But, on the other hand, sovereignty cannot allow states to brutally step on the
Human Rights of its citizens without the international community being able to go on
their assistance.
The protection of civilians is a legal concept based on international
humanitarian, human rights and refugee law, while the R2P is still more of a political
discussion. In any case, the concepts are interlinked and cannot be forgotten by the
international community.
But still, perhaps the most fundamental mistake is to try to compare Human
Rights treaties with “common” treaties. In other words, the Legality cannot be the
prime aspect to look for when we address Human Rights violations.
We do already have enormous paraphernalia of instruments likely to avoid
gross humanitarian crisis: UNC, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, The
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, The UN Security Council, the
International Criminal and Human Rights courts, etc.
We have also seen that the international community sometimes intervenes in

“The Responsibility to Protect”- Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty, Pag. 74/75.
21 Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A more secure world: our shared
responsibility, UN Doc. A/59/565, 2 December 2004;
ICJ, Legal consequences of the Construction of a wall in the occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion of
9 July 2004, ICJ Reports 2004, paras.158-161;
The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by Resolution 260 (III) A
of the UN General Assembly on ) December 1948, entry into force 12 January 1951
20
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humanitarian crisis and sometimes doesn’t, based on these same existing instruments.
The central question is, in my opinion, one of compromise and cooperation
between states, not only in terms of empowering the existing prevention mechanisms
but mainly in terms of not giving up to their selfish strategic interests in the face of
humanitarian crisis.
I believe that former UNSG, Kofi Anan does provide the right path when he said
that:
“Humanitarian intervention is a sensitive issue, fraught with political difficulty
and not susceptible to easy answers. But surely no legal principle—not even
sovereignty—can ever shield crimes against humanity. Where such crimes occur and
peaceful attempts to halt them have been exhausted, the Security Council has a moral
duty to act on behalf of the international community. The fact that we cannot protect
people everywhere is no reason for doing nothing when we can. Armed intervention
must always remain the option of last resort, but in the face of mass murder it is an
option that cannot be relinquished”22
Only one thing is missing and perhaps overlooked by Mr. Kofi Annan:
morality is often preached but seldom exercised and at times serves very vicious
masters.

of United Nations Secretary General “We the peoples: the role of the United Nations in the 21 st Century”,
A/54/2000, 27 March 2000. Para. 219.

22Report
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Prohibition of use of force and the right of states self-defense –
For centuries the state’s primary self-help mechanism when the power of law
ceased23, was the resort to war. War was a right inherent to the concept of sovereignty of
a state.
The grounds for this form of forcible self-help were progressively reduced24 and
presently the use of force by states as means for the settlement of disputes is
circumscribed to situations of individual or collective self-defense, if an armed attack
occurs, or if the use of armed force is in the common interest25 of the international
community, that is to say, if the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) endorses or
imposes it.
Alongside the limitations to the use of force enshrined on the United Nations
Charter (UNC), the refrain on states to resort to the use of force has been reiterated
and echoed in case law generating customary international law26.
While International Law recognizes the right of states to engage in lawful
settlement of disputes27 but, with the entry into force of the UNC, the resource to the use
of force was been circumscribed. Instead, the UNC has established Judicial28 and
“The grounds of war are as numerous as those of judicial actions. For where the power of law ceases, there war
begins.(…)The justifiable causes generally assigned for war are three: defense, indemnity and punishment”. In
The Law of War and Peace, H. Grotius, 1625, book II, chapter I, II.1,2.
24 Examples of the progressive attempts to limit the resource of states to the use of force can be found in: Article 1 of the 1907 The Hague (III) relative to the opening of hostilities; - Article 2 (para. 1) of the 1907 The
Hague (II) Convention Respecting The Limitation Of The Employment Of Force For The recovery Of Contract
Debts; - Articles 10 and 12 of the Covenant of the League of Nations (1919); - Articles 1 and 2 of the Pact on the
Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy (‘Briand–Kellogg Pact’1928).
25 Preamble of the UN Charter, second paragraph.
26 “The Court should now mention the principle of respect for State sovereignty, which in International Law is of
course linked with the principles of the prohibition of use of force and non-intervention” (ICJ, Nicaragua 1986,
para. 212, p.111).
23

“The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international
peace and
security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation,
arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of
their own choice. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute
by such means.”- Article 33, UN Charter.
28 Chapter XIV of the UNC, Article 92: “The International Court of Justice [ICJ] shall be the principal judicial
organ of the United Nations (…)”. ICJ’s Statute is annexed to the UNC itself.
Article 1 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice: “The International Court of Justice established by the
Charter of the United Nations as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations (…).”27
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Political29 Organs to serve as states primary contentious arenas whenever direct or third
party’s sponsored negotiations fail to resolve states disputes.
A quick overview into the background and chain of events that led to the birth of
the UNC allows us to realize that the “old systems” to insure peace30 had proven to be
weak deterrents against the ever present spectrum of war.
Events which occurred in the half of the twentieth century add substance to that
statement: the increasingly destructive character of wars demonstrated to states that new
ways were necessary.
Industrialization, the technological advances witnessed in the armament
industries producing weapons of greater destructive capacity and the emergence of
nation-states - adding the dangerous sense of nationalism - changed drastically the
character of modern armed conflicts.
The battlefield is no longer a remote arena where small professional armies
struggle for a victory leaving practically untouched the civilian populations. All citizens
are now mobilized to contribute to the efforts of war, either participating in the fighting
or working in the factories that insure war logistics. Thus, everyone becomes a target.
Nuclear technology is used militarily for the first time. This was perhaps the
“red light” for states who realized that mankind’s very existence would be at risk if
strong collective measures were not imposed to proscribe the resource to war as means
to settle disputes or settlement of borders.
The League of Nations (LoN) – the first serious attempt of the international
community to circumscribe the use of force - had endeavored to restrain states from the
The most relevant are the General Assembly (GA) – established by force of article 7 (1) of the UNC and regulated
by the provisions of Chapter IV- and the Security Council (SC) – established by force of same article 7 (1) and
regulated by the provisions of chapter V of the UNC.
30 Those classical systems are described as:
The empire system (Pax romana) whereby a group of states was shielded under the protective umbrella of a higher
monarch; The political hegemony of some nations over certain regions which they dominated by influence (classic
example is the US vs the URSS), and the equilibrium of powers or “politique de la bascule”, which was never very
reliable or effective given the difficulty on assuring an equilibrium when all excelled to always be one step ahead.
29

19

resource to war31, but it did not proscribe it entirely32 and lacked the mechanisms and
representativeness necessary to ensure effectiveness or enforcement. This bitter reality
was well evidenced by the break of WWII which dictated its dissolution, officially
declared in 1946 although the LoN was virtually terminated since the beginning of
WWII.
Still, the collective wish for a supra national organ which could save succeeding
generations from the scourge of war33 and could avoid that yet another generalized
conflict occurs - now with the potential to wipe mankind from the face of the earth subsisted.
This idea of a collective security system was consecutively shaped and
materialized into the UNC which gave birth to the United Nations (UN).
The UN was intended to pursue a number of fundamental purposes, enumerated
on chapter I of the UNC and further detailed throughout the following chapters, but one
was considered the direst, as it follows from its rather dramatic preamble: to insure that
international34 peace was not breached ever again.
In fact, article 1 (1) of the UNC provides clear evidence of the absolute priority
given to that concern:
“The purposes of the United Nations are: 1. To maintain international peace and
security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and
removal of threats to the peace (…)”.

Article 12 of The Covenant of the League of Nations imposed that “The Members of the League agree (…) in no
case to resort to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators or the judicial decision (…)”.
32 Idem. After the three months deadline elapsed the resort to war was no longer unlawful.
33 Preamble of the UN Charter, first paragraph.
34 Force pertaining to “internal affairs” is not covered. In fact article 2.4 of the UNC leaves that very clear:
“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations”. This preoccupation had naturally to do with the wish to respect the Sovereignty of states by
limiting the room for interference with domestic affairs but intended also to keep out of the scope the relations
between colonial powers and their dependent territories, which then was a relevant and sensitive matter.
31
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But taking “effective collective measures” had proven to be a very difficult task
during the times of the LoN and this time the UNC provides for another approach:
-

The establishment of a collective organ mandated and effectively capable of
enforcing the peace35;

-

The definition of the situations or circumstances in which that organ shall
intervene36;

-

The eligibility of the cases for intervention to be determined by that organ
alone37 and;

-

The exigency that the interests the organ is to defend are universal38.
Such an organ materialized as the Security Council (SC) which was entrusted

with the “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security”39 and given the most extensive powers40 “to ensure prompt and effective
action by the United Nations”41.
Those extensive powers and effective action go as far as to comprehend the use
of force, which among all the organs established by the UNC, is a privilege reserved to
the SC. The SC is therefore, par excellence, the competent organ on the UN to authorize
states to use force.

Article 42 of the UNC reads:
“Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41
Article 24 (2) of the UNC
“Any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and
security”- Article 33 (1) of the UNC.
“Threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” - Article 39 of the UNC.
37 “The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties” - Article 33 (2) of the UNC.
“The Security Council shall determine the existence” – Article 39 of the UNC.
35
36

Both the articles (33 and 39) opening Chapter VI (Pacific settlement of disputes) and Chapter VII ( Action
with respect to threats to peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression) clearly state the demand for an
International character of the cases eligible for intervention. Internal disputes of States are excluded (provided
that internal disputes do not threaten international peace and security or spread across national borders).
39 Article 24 (1) of the UNC
40 The powers are generically contemplated in Article 24 (2) of the UNC, but it is article 25 which does give
virtually unlimited power to the SC to impose its decisions. That was the interpretation of the ICJ (in 1971,
Namibia Advisory opinion) who considered that the SC is not only bound to decide only if there is a specific
provision allowing it to decide.
41 Article 24 (1) of the UNC
38
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would be inadequate, or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air,
sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and
security.

Such

action

may

include

demonstrations,

blockade,

and

other

operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations”
This article insures the SC a large margin of discretion: the element of
proportionality is not demanded and even necessity is not much present42. On the other
hand, there is no obligation to pass by the measures preconized by article 4143 first, the
SC decides as it pleases.
Although appearing legally permissive, the application of article 42 by the SC
raises the issue of its enforcement as the SC has limited intervention capacity and may
only recourse to state member’s military assistance. Article 43 (1) of the UNC indeed
provides for that:
“All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the
maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the
Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or
agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage,
necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.”
However, it was never implemented44 and therefore the SC has only one way
out: to delegate enforcement on State members with the capacity and willingness to
intervene relying on their own military capacity to act on its behalf and with its
benediction.
But this delegation of powers or “authorizations regime” does also pose rather
challenging problems:

42Although customary law still demands for its observance.

Measures not involving the use of force.
Which implies that the following articles 43, 44, 45, 46, 47 are somehow obsolete. The “Military Staff
Committee” referred to in article 47 was indeed created and meets regularly but practically with empty
agendas.
43
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• The decision to implement collective defense is rather regulated by practice
rather than by law.
Article 53 of the UNC does refer to the possibility of delegation or authorization
stating that the SC may “utilize (…) regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement
action under its authority”. However, the substance here is to grant the SC the
possibility to resource to preexisting “regional arrangements or agencies for dealing
with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security”45.
Thus, the aim of article 53 is not to regulate upon the delegation or authorizations
regime but to take advantage of the potentially higher likelihood for success these
regional entities have in comparison to isolated or random groups of states. Their
regional and collegial character confers them higher levels of acceptance from the
state(s) being intervened. Their goal of maintaining international peace, common to the
purposes of the SC, supposes more experience dealing with related matters than any
other available “agent” the SC could recur to.
• Greatly exposes the SC original goals to the private agendas or arbitrary
interpretations of the state members entrusted with the active enforcement of the
measures46 decided by the SC. This is still more troublesome because in many occasions
the SC delegates in very generic or vague terms providing grounds for abuse.
A paradigmatic case is that of the operation codenamed desert storm, also
referred to as first Gulf War.
On the 29th November 1990, after a series of previous other resolutions,
condemning Iraqi’s invasion and unilateral/forcible annexation of Kuwait, the SC
decided, through Resolution 678, to authorize
“Member States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait…to use all
necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent
relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area;
[Requested] all States to provide appropriate support for the actions undertaken in
Article 52 of the UNC.
The SC can only delegate in regards to the forces it wishes to be enforcing on its behalf. The measures
themselves cannot be delegated.
45
46
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pursuance … of the present resolution;[Requested] the States concerned to …
regularly [inform] on the progress of actions undertaken [and decided] to remain seized
of the matter.”
A coalition force from 34 nations led by the United States responded to the SC’s
Resolution setting Kuwait free from Iraqi forces but further invading Iraqi territory
stopping only a few kilometers from Bagdad.
The intervention forces argued that it was necessary to insure that Iraq would not
repeat the aggression by debilitating to the most extent his armed forces. Others would
say that the United States took advantage of the “blank check” given by the SC to
promote its domestic interests of weakening and punishing Saddam Hussein.
Polemics aside, truth is that according the SC’s wording in Resolution 678, its
whishes were to “uphold and implement resolution 660”. In turns, Resolution 660
central commandment to Iraq was that it would “withdraw immediately and
unconditionally all its forces to the positions in which they were located on

1

August 1990”, i.e, back within its internationally recognized borders: Bagdad is 600
kilometers away from the border with Kuwait!
• The states exercising effective enforcement under SC’s Resolutions are free to
step out when they unilaterally decide. This can have tremendous implications mostly in
operational terms - the enforcement capacity is affected and the remaining forces, if
any, are left more exposed themselves – but can also have political repercussions by
undermining the credibility of the SC and exposing remaining contingents to enhanced
animosities;
• The absence of temporal limitation might lead to incessant validity of the
Resolution’s dispositions through the (ab)use of “reverse veto”47, i.e, one of the

The veto is a negative vote by one of the PMs that prohibits a decision taken by majority. In itself the veto
does not mean “no”, it means “no” to a decision already taken by majority. The “reverse veto” signifies that the
PM exercising it does not aim to stop the adoption of a particular measure but to stop the revision or
suspension of a measure previously implemented.
47
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Permanent members ( PMs) opposes to the review or renewal of a Resolution already
in force (“sunset clauses”).
• The common scenario of multinational forces with different languages, different
policies and rules of engagement, different and sometimes competing leaderships are all
factors likely to potentiate operational and political added concern.
The resource to the use of force under the umbrella of article 42 is substantiated,
grosso modo, in violations by states to article 2 (4) of the UNC:
“All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations”.
With reference to article 39 of the UNC:
“The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace48, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide
what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or
restore international peace and security.”
But the UNC contemplates another legal provision accepting the use of force,
which was briefly mentioned in the introduction to this paper.
The provision is article 51 which reads:
“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security.

In international relations terminology is very important. The SC normally prefers referring to “breach of the
peace” instead of “act of aggression”. This is because such attitude allows greater amplitude to the SC. Referring
to a state as “aggressor” will surely limit the probability of success in the settlement of a dispute and can even
be self-defeating to the SC due to the negative connotation of the concept and the stigma it imposes, unless the
eventual transgressor is isolated. On the other hand, the label of “aggression” might also lead to consequences
under the International Criminal Court (ICC) and thus the SC tends to avoid being entangled on these
questions.
48
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Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be
immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the
authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at
any time such action

as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore

international peace and security”
This right to self-defense, represents, in UNC49, the only exceptional cases in
which states are still “tolerated”50 the resource to the use of force without prior consent
or determination by the SC.
Still, like in the case of the use of force under article 42 of the UNC, the analysis
of article 51 permits a numbers of legal and political considerations:
•

As highlighted on the article’s legal text above, the triggering mechanism
or conditio materialis for the resource to self-defense is the occurrence of
an “armed attack”.

•

At this point, it is relevant to look for the definition of aggression and
which acts would fit the notion of armed attack. “Armed attack” is not
the same as “use of force”, to defend the terms as synonyms would mean
to consider that articles 2 (4) and 51 of the UNC are alike in substance.

The notion of act of aggression is relevant as regards to article 39 and from there
to justify the recourse to 42 by the SC whereas the question of what might constitute an
armed attack interests particularly in regards to article 51.
UN General Assembly (GA) Resolution 3314 provides for both those definitions
of aggression and the acts of aggression representing “armed attack”.
“Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty,
territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this
Definition.

49
50

International Customary law also contemplates the right to self-defense by states.
It is not an absolute and/or discretionary right.
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Explanatory note: In this Definition the term "State":
(a) Is used without prejudice to questions of recognition or to whether a State is
a member of the United Nations; (b) Includes the concept of a "group of States"
where appropriate.” 51
“Any of the following acts, … qualify as an act of aggression: (a) The
invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another State, or any
military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any
annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State or part thereof,…(g)The
sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or

mercenaries,

which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such

gravity as to

amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement

therein”. 52

We underlined “g” because the acts described can lead conflicting
interpretations, notably with regards to acts of terrorism. In this connection, unless clear
ties between a terrorist group and a harboring/sponsoring state are proved, article 51
would not apply53.
In Congo vs. Uganda the ICJ considered that an attack perpetrated or coming
from an armed group cannot trigger article 51 unless there are clear signs of
complicity between that group and a specific state.
•

Article 51 stipulates that the armed attack must be against a member of the UN.

The aggression must be directed against the territory (sovereignty) of a state. However,
others consider that an attack directed against citizens of a particular state, even if
perpetrated out of its territory, might justify the resource to use of force self-defense54.
• The second paragraph of article 51 also requires that any use of force in selfdefense must be reported immediately to the Council, and that the state must cease using
force once the Council has taken the measures ‘necessary’ to maintain international
peace and security. It seems reasonable to admit that the adopted measures would have
Article 1
Article 3
53 “If the terrorist attack involves the responsibility of a State, it may, depending on the circumstances, constitute
an armed attack and therefore justify action by way of self-defense” . In “Principles of Public International Law“,
Part XIII, “The use or threat of force by States”, Ian Brownlie, Oxford University Press, page 713.
54 However, assuming self-defense could be argued on those terms, such arguing would not ground itself on
article 51 but rather on the self-defense notion coming from customary law, reference made to the Caroline
case. There necessity is said to justify invoking and enforcing self-defense. Article 51’s notion of self-defense is
stricter but customary law does go in parallel, even if its dominance would defeat the purpose of article 51.
51
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to be implemented and proven effective before the state hands over its self-defense on
those terms.
• Unlike other provisions or concepts in the UNC which resulted from the
evolution and tailoring of preexisting texts, namely the Covenant of the LoN, article 51
has no predecessor. This “regulation” of self-defense was mentioned for the first time in
the UNC. The reason for that is that the use of force had not been prohibited before.
• The right of states to self-defense is also framed by customary law. The Caroline
Case, in 1837, being its historic source. The case referred to the seizure and destruction,
by British forces in US territory of a vessel being used by US nationals in assisting an
armed rebellion by Canadians over the border, Canada then being a British colony. It
framed the right to self-defense within the principle of absolute necessity and
proportionality. US Secretary of State Webster then declared that, in order to be lawful,
such recourse to force in self-defense required:
“A necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means,
and no moment for deliberation [and involving] nothing unreasonable or excessive;
since the act, justified by the necessity of self-defense, must be limited by that necessity,
and kept clearly within it.”
• Reprisals or punitive attacks do not constitute self-defense, since by definition
they would be disproportionate. To be defensive, and therefore lawful, the armed
reprisals must be future-oriented55, and not limited to a desire to punish past
aggressions.
• In the case of collective self-defense56(as under Article V of the North Atlantic
Treaty), there must first be a request from the state eligible to argue for self-defense. A
collective security organization like NATO can only ‘decide’ to use force as an internal

Not to confuse with measures of “anticipatory” self-defense. These would be unlawful and it is unrealistic to
expect that if such permeability was to be supported legally it would not give grounds for abuse.
56 The self-defense measures are undefined; however “collective measures” take precedence over “individual
measures”. Feared to be more anarchical the later are superseded by the former.
55
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decision. Only with the endorsement of the SC or a legal basis in customary
international law, such as self-defense can pass to action.
• Case law has been proficient in underlining the inadmissibility of flexible and
extensive interpretation of article 51 of the UN Charter in general and the concept of
self-defense in particular. Emphasis is placed on the existence of alternative means at
the disposal of States to whom they may/must address their disputes or concerns:
“(…) Article 51 of the Charter may justify a use of force in self-defense only within
the strict confines there laid down. It does not allow the use of force by a State to protect
perceived security interests beyond these parameters. Other means are available to a
concerned State, including, in particular, recourse to the Security Council (…)”57
• The strict inviolability of the States territorial sovereignty has also been
reminded in case law. In the Corfu Channel Case, the ICJ has adjudicated that the
invocation of self-defense will not consubstantiate into permeable and liberal
interpretations that might transmute into mere violations of States sovereignty:
“(…) between independent states, respect for territorial sovereignty is an essential
foundation of international relations (…) the action of the British Navy constituted a
violation of Albanian sovereignty” 58
We have already referred above to the veto power of the SC/PMs. Still, because
since the birth of the UNC it has in many occasions, particularly during the cold war
period59, played a central role, it deserves further consideration.
The exercise of veto is probably the best example of the exposure of a legal rule
– provided for in article 27 (1) of the UNC - to political purposes or interests. The veto
ICJ, Judgment of 19 December 2005, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of
Congo v. Uganda) - Para. 148
58 ICJ, 9 April 1949, Corfu Channel case (United Kingdom of Great Britan and Nothern Ireland v. Albania), page
35.
59 Unanimity among the PMs was impossible to achieve and the SC was constantly blocked. The GA attempted
to overcome that and assumed a more relevant role during that period, still the UNC does not grant the GA
similar powers as to the SC. The GA can only make recommendations.
57
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has blocked60 the SC in many occasions and that has granted it a somehow negative
connotation but it has also been the grant that decisions can actually see the light of day
as well.
Demanding unanimity to pass decisions61 would represent in itself a veto to the
extent that one dissenting vote would block the decision. The veto has been a way to
insure decisions are managed by the states with actual power and resources to act. At the
same time it is a way of avoiding that those states (PMs) do not actively turn against
each other.
The figure of abstention, despite the provision set on article 27 (3) of the UNC,
is not to be regarded as a veto, on the grounds of an 1971 ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on
Namibia setting customary law.
By way of conclusion, we can say that much criticism and disbelief can be
argued against the UNC and its organs.
As regards to Chapter VII almost absolute powers of the SC62, one can wonder
what can really states do when confronted with an unreasonable or despotic decision.
The “saving” feature is that Chapter VII decisions relate to “police measures” aimed at
emergency situations, the SC cannot legislate63. Hence, decisions can and have been
questioned by the member states considering themselves victims of excessive zeal.
Its legal texts have often been interpreted with dubious respect for the spirit they
were embedded with at the time of their conception. Political interests have often been
spoken louder and manipulated it to their advantage. The SC has been blocked by the
exercise of veto, conceived to be an enabler for decisions but in many occasions
exercised to defeat that very purpose.
When the SC is blocked by veto the GA may recommend measures, but it cannot really act.
The case with the LoN, which required unanimity in the Council.
62The SC is not bound by International or treaty law (article 102 of the UNC). Despite article 103 of the UNC
stating its precedence in case of conflicting rules, some scholars have arguably defended that Jus Cogens
normative rules have in fact precedence over the UNC.
63 Resolution 1373 is an exception: it was approved under Chapter VII and it is binding under article 25, of the
UNC.
60
61
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It has been said to be contrary to long standing rules of customary law, arguably
by truthful concern about their precedence but rather to enjoy the preferential ruling of
the later. Active violations to its principles and purposes have not been few either. There
is certainly still a long way to go in the perusal of all its self-imposed purposes and
principles.
However, a disaster such as those of WWI and WWII has so far been prevented.
Despite all the limitations discussed above, and certainly others we failed to mention,
the UNC is still the most effective instrument, if not the only, for the enforcement of
peace in the world.
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CONCLUSION
In view of the above, it seems that the State’s sovereignty is definitely
compromised. In order to have peace and stability in the world, the United Nations may
intervene to resolve State’s conflicts or disputes. This intervention must primarily
choose a diplomatic and thus peaceful, path64.
But when these methods prove themselves ineffective or insufficient and thus all
means for the peaceful settlements of disputes between states have been exhausted the
international communities, through the Security Council, can resource to the use of
force against a sovereign state65.
This possibility to resource to the use of forcible means, which may go as far as
military intervention66, has place not only regarding ongoing breaches of peace – when
hostilities have already materialized- but it may also assume a preventive character in
order to stop a serious threat to peace from developing into actual active hostilities67.
As such, sovereignty is indeed not an absolute shield for states against states,
allowing those with such status to do whatever they please, either inside or outside their
borders. In terms of the obligations dictated by the UN Charter, this is only true
regarding actions from states that might represent a threat to the peace, breach of the
peace or act of aggression68.
In any other case, the sovereignty of the state and its territorial integrity rests
immaculate. Article 2 (1) of the UN Charter establishes very clearly that the
Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members and,
in point 7, establishes that the United Nations [cannot] intervene in matters which are
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to
submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter.
In more specific terms, we must also consider other limitations to State’s
sovereignty. In legal terms, the late professor Antonio Cassese dedicates a full chapter
to the subject of Limitations on State Sovereignty. He starts it by referring quite clearly

64“All

Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international
peace and security, and justice, are not endangered”. Article 2 (3) of the UN Charter
65 Under UN Charter, Chapter VII ( article 2 (6) .
66 Article 42 of the UN Charter
67 “…to maintain or restore international peace and security” in, article 39 of the UN Charter
68 Article 39 of the UN Charter
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that:
“State sovereignty is not unfettered. Many International rules restrict it. In
addition to treaty rules […] limitations are imposed upon State sovereignty by
customary rules. They are the natural legal consequence of the obligation to respect the
sovereignty of other states”69
But other aspects, other than those ruled by international law legal principles,
have become unavoidable when discussing state’s sovereignty.
Globalization is perhaps the most relevant and the one impacting most on states
sovereignty.
The effects of modern technologies, which allow for “real time” and worldwide
exchanges, pose a threat to individual identity of nations. This is more so in regards to
economic repercussions. The increasing and continuous economical interdependency
between the nation states weakens the governments; just as well the economical ‘war’
taking the lead, definitely degrades the original meaning of a state’s sovereignty.
Political and legal sovereignty could never be dissociated from the international
economic arena. Economic interests have always been part of the relations between
states. Many wars and disputes took place for economic reasons. Initially the reason was
to insure subsistence - fight for fertile lands and rich territories – and later to insure
hegemonic trade monopolies.
However, in current times the global economy has taken the dominant role. It is
no longer to be seen as just another factor to take in consideration but as the central
concern of sovereignty. Modern disputes, military or not, even if at times masked with
social, cultural, ethnic and religious motivations, all derive from that centrality of
global economy.
This is well corroborated with the prevailing tendency for states to associate into
economic frameworks in order to diminish the effects of their exposure to economic
globalization.
The European Union is a good recent example. States of the “old continent”
realized that their individual survival would be best assured if they associated into a
stronger allegiance. This allegiance did allow them the enhanced capacity to confront
the economical might the United States, Russia, China.
69
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But this was not possible without a demand for permeability of the individual
states to concessions in their political/legal sovereignty: like the treaty of Schengen and
its abolition of border control for state members’ nationals.
Hence, modern Sovereignty tends to be more a concept representing the
boundaries of a certain cultural identity and less the condition of absolute independence
of a state to discretionarily rule a nation on a given territory.
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